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' is paper is based on author’s three-year research on the choices patients make when facing an 
illness, on the decisions they make in choosing a particular medical system and medical treatment, 
and on the reasons of the increasing popularity of complementary and alternative medical practices 
in contemporary Croatia. Starting from the patients’ narratives and their embodied experience as 
presented through heir encounters with illness, the paper discusses and analyzes the methodological, 
theoretical and epistemological realities of the co-existence of biomedicine and complementary and 
alternative Medicine (CAM). 
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In biomedical, or as Foucault calls it, ‘clinical’ se, ing, patients’ narratives are funneled down 
through a strict process of very radical selection of information until all the multiple contexts 
of patients’ reasoning are reduced to one diagnosis. / e diagnosis is set at the micro level 
of one, biomedical, reality. Anthropological thought, on the other hand, is multivocal and 
plural, since it encompasses human voices, which are discordant and polyphone, and are 
especially so when they relate to human notions of disease, pain, wellbeing, lived experience, 
embodiment, etc. Hence, there seems to exist a huge epistemological gap between the two 
worlds of thought. How can we then research and discuss or, even more, try to " nd a kind of 
analytical reasoning which would clarify human notions of health, illness, body, life, death, 
trauma, su) ering, in the co-existence of biomedicine and complementary and alternative 
medicine? We need a kind of a world between the two worlds of thought, a kind of para-
doxical third reality, which could serve as the centre of the hourglass, in order to analyze the 
“medical” concepts in today’s, medically plural, world. I will try to show, based on my own 
research, how medical anthropology provides the basic framework, but how every research, 
especially a research set in today’s world of shi+ ing meanings, rapid changes and constant 
questioning of the pa, erns we inhabit, demands a radical re-modeling and re-designing of 
the methodological and theoretical frameworks. In researching medical pluralism we are 
dealing not only with several worlds of thought, a challenge for the analysis as such, but also 
with new, unpredictable, contexts and newly emerging meanings, which demand from the 
researcher to be constantly ‘alert’ and constantly ready to re-shape and rethink the research 
steps she has taken. / e hourglass of our research constantly gets turned upside down. 
Starting from the patients’ narratives and their embodied experience as presented 
through their encounters with illness, the paper discusses and analyzes the methodological, 
theoretical and epistemological realities of the co-existence of complementary and alterna-
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My research was mainly concerned with the analysis of decision-making process the 
patients make when they encounter a speci" c illness, i.e. the analysis and discussion of the 
choices they make and the reasoning behind it. I was commonly faced with the idea of mul-
tiple reasoning (Ma, ingly 1998). / at means that the choices of healing processes, treat-
ments and medical systems the patients would choose, where highly dependant on their 
background (age, gender, occupation, religious beliefs, cultural background), but also on 
their knowledge of popular medicine, popular knowledge of biomedicine, or, it could some-
times depend on the last commercial of a speci" c drug they’ve seen on TV or the advice they 
were given by their " rst neighbor during a joint ride in the elevator. / e narrativity of their 
health situation surpassed by far the ‘clinical’ de" nitions of the disease. Moreover, it could be 
said that only small portion of their ideas about the possible causes and outcomes of their ill-
ness/disease, dovetailed with those o) ered by the biomedical system. However, in the words 
of one of my informants, a biomedical doctor, the biomedicine has also changed in the last 
few years, in accepting a more ‘active’ role of the patients and trying to include the patients’ 
beliefs and notions about their own disease/illness in the ‘healing’ encounter. / e idea was 
to provide the patients with the position of control over their own medical ‘destiny’ and of 
allocating some of the power, the biomedicine was so richly awarded, as Foucault sharply 
de" ned (Foucault 1963), to the patients themselves. However, it seemed that the patients 
have already ‘taken over’, with the process of demysti" cation of biomedicine starting during 
the 1970s (Leslie 2001), or have never ‘surrendered’ completely, and that human notions of 
health and illness always surpass any given medical system. 
Probing Experience
Phenomenology as applied to anthropology in the last two, three decades seemed a useful 
tool for analyzing this situation. Phenomenology’s ‘general’ appeal to start analyzing any hu-
man condition from the idea of lived human experience in all its richness (Moran 2000:2), 
from the irrefutable fact that all knowledge is immersed and arises from lived and very much 
subjective experience (Moran 2000:21). could be easily detected in Merleau-Ponty’s earlier 
work on phenomenology of perception (1962), where he proclaimed the lived body and the 
bodily experience and perception as pivotal to human existence in the world, “the vehicle of 
being-in-the-world (Merleau-Ponty 1962:71). Body and experience, or bodily experience 
and the world stood for Merleau-Ponty in a unique relationship, the one that was later taken 
up by / omas Csordas in his idea of embodiment (Csordas 1990). Hence, it became clear to 
me that I was dealing with and analyzing the embodied experiences of my informants, their 
immediate senses and sensibilities, their concepts of pain, quali" cations and quanti" cations 
of su) ering, their coping with their experiences and, " nally, creating narratives of their expe-
riences. I’ve found the concepts of medical systems to be completely useless and the concept 
of medical pluralism, even though conceptually helpful, to be equally misguiding in analyz-
ing the ‘lived’ accounts of the lived experiences of health and illness. 
Namely, the guiding principle in the decision making processes the patients, my inform-
ants, were undergoing when facing an illness/disease, was their own lived experience and 
they were absolutely disinterested in any divisions between medical systems and neither 
were they making their decisions about which system, treatment or healer/physician to use 
on any careful pre-consideration. It was part of their ‘learned’ lived experience to always visit 
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the biomedical physician " rst (that’s what they did when they were children, that’s what their 
parents did), but if, for some reason, they were not satis" ed with the results (the migraines 
did not go away, the allergies were still there, the rash persistent, chronic pain ge, ing worse), 
they would seek help somewhere else, in di) erent forms of complementary and alternative 
medicine. Again, depending on their (dis)satisfaction, their subjective notion of the results 
of the treatment and, most directly, of what they experienced on a certain therapy (friendli-
ness and good rapport, comfort, relief, satisfaction, being paid a, ention to, being listened 
to, con" dence in the healer, atmosphere established, possible improvements, possible di-
minishing of pain or discomfort, etc.), they would continue with the same therapy, expand 
their search, or move on. / ey were creating their own web of ‘medical systems’, enmeshed 
and complex, seemingly arbitrary, but following a path of thick detailed experiential events, 
each a small answer to the question of what makes sense to them, just as Geertz explained 
in his more quoted version of the de" nition of culture in which he stated: “believing, with 
Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of signi" cance he himself has spun, I 
take culture to be those webs (…)” (Geertz 1973:5). / is de" nition was Geertz’s seminal 
introduction to considering anthropology an interpretative science, a claim which he, in a 
way, expanded thirteen years later in his another seminal work, an epilogue to Turner and 
Bruner’s edited volume from 1986, ‘! e Anthropology of Experience’. 
He starts from the idea that “no one (…) is ever really short of experience” and that 
“we all have very much more of the stu)  than we know what to do with it (…)” (Geertz 
1986:373). I " nd very useful this de" nition of experience as ‘stu) ’, since it is exactly this, as 
I stated earlier, enmeshed and complex, seemingly arbitrary and random, but still meaning 
making and life designing pendulum that makes us who we are. But in dealing with experi-
ence, conceptually, analytically, is that we are ‘lacking’: “(…) if we fail to put it (‘it’ being the 
stu)  of experience) into some graspable form the fault must lie in a lack of means, not of sub-
stance.” (Geertz 1986:373). Hence, it is not that we lack experience, we have abundance of 
that ‘stu) ’, but we have to devise the means to grasp it, and in Geertz’s words, those who have 
found the means, they have ‘authored themselves’ (Myerho)  in Geertz 1986:373), “made 
themselves someone to whom a, ention must be paid” (Geertz 1986:373). In short, by put-
ting our experiences in a graspable form, we are becoming the authors of our own interpreta-
tion of ourselves, and demand that the a, ention must be paid to our own ‘authority’. (I refer 
here both to the position of the author and authority as jurisdiction and control.) 
Questioning Methodology 
Admi, edly, I did not think too much of it at the time of doing my research, and if I did, 
my analysis would move away from deconstructing the relationship between biomedicine 
and CAM. Instead, while doing my research, I got caught up in a very alluring trap. As a 
researcher, I was ' a, ered and a bit egotistically upli+ ed with the gratitude my informants, 
patients, were expressing to me just because I was – listening to them. I was, actually, pay-
ing a, ention. Sometimes they simply wanted to narrate their own etiologies of their disease 
(they wanted to be able to tell what they think was the cause of the disease), i.e. narrate their 
illness experience: death of a spouse as a cause of breast cancer, refugee situation as a cause 
of colon cancer, stress and anxiety as the cause of problems with thyroid gland. Not only they 
themselves found the cause of their disease which made sense to them, they would put it in 
the rationale of their everyday lives and would explain their su) ering in general. Or some of 
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them would simply say something like: ‘I talk, but no one listens!’, or ‘Nobody ever listens to me 
when I speak about my disease’, or, a bit scary: ‘I never told this to anyone, not even to my wife!’ 
So, while doing my research I felt useful and I felt, a bit vainly, like I was ‘making a di) erence’, 
as a sympathetic listener and the one who pays a, ention. 
Interestingly enough, my informants would sometimes contextualize their ‘" ndings’ in 
their encounters with the biomedical doctors, too (some of them didn’t since they feared of 
being stigmatized), and those who did found it important for the doctors to take them seri-
ously, to pay a, ention):
I had four houses…not at the same place…but one was where we were at home and one 
up at the mountain and a co, age… I was building one for my daughter…we weren’t rich, 
but we had enough…and then, on that morning, I had to leave, with one small plastic bag 
in which I put my money… ha? And now you tell me!… Everything’s gone, everything!… 
And now they tell me I have cancer – of course I have cancer, I told him: “Doctor, you 
would have it, too”… and he was looking at me as if I were crazy. Maybe I am crazy, but a+ er 
that everyone would be crazy!
As it is obvious from the example above, if not taken ‘seriously’, if they felt were not allowed 
authority over their graspable form of their lived experience, they felt disempowered, voice-
less and, sometimes, stigmatized. 
At that stage of my research, when I also felt a li, le discouraged, with li, le authority over 
what I was doing, since I felt I was just a sympathetic listener, I thought that my major prob-
lems were methodological. Hence I set out to de" ne the speci" cities of qualitative method-
ology which should be used in medical se, ing with the aim to outline the guidelines for the 
‘appropriate’ ethnographic methods. In my view, these would be the ones that would enable 
me to analyze and de" ne the type of data which can be obtained through qualitative clinical 
interviews and hence provide certain quali" cations and categorizations and prove useful to 
all the participants in the healing process (doctors and patients) and, epistemologically, to all 
the disciplines involved (biomedicine and anthropology).
In the growing tide of the publications on the topic, there is an increasing number of bio-
medical doctors writing manuals in qualitative methodology as applied to heath care. / ey 
are manuals in the strictest sense of the term, since they start usually with the de" nition of 
what culture is and then provide the recipe as how to do the proper qualitative (open-ended, 
in-depth) interviews and data analysis. / ey sometimes include the guidelines as to what to 
wear to the interview, how to behave, or warn the potential interviewer not to show openly 
her/his body decorations or symbols of religious or football a0  liation. Practical as they may 
seem, to the anthropologists used to doing " eldwork, they might appear naïve and – useless. 
Training manual in applied anthropology (Carole Hill ed. 2010), emphasizes that applied 
anthropology is ‘not an arena for either foolish or faint hearted’. Or in Doing Health Anthro-
pology (Christie Kiefer, 2007): ‘It takes courage to do action anthropology’. Even though 
such advice seems fairly impractical (how to make a researcher brave hearted instead of faint 
hearted), the quick discussion on the nature of applied anthropology which will follow later 
will at least explain its groundedness. 
Questioning Theory of Illness
Illness narratives, or simply, patients’ stories, which I was listening to as part of my " eldwork, 
were theoretically already ‘an old thing’, de" ned by Arthur Kleinman in as early as 1988. 
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Arthur Kleinman (1992) saw illness, pain, healing, su) ering, as very ‘special types of experi-
ence’, those where body, subjectivity, personhood are so much present and intertwined that 
it will always be di0  cult to analyze or conceptualize them. But, exactly because of that rea-
son, he saw health and illness as very potent " elds for examining human experience. Illness 
narratives were just a ‘discursive counterpart’ of experience and through them we could un-
derstand peoples’ ‘moral worlds’, which was essential for " nding out what exactly is at stake 
for the people themselves, the di) erences in which their explanatory models di) er from bio-
medical model. Narrative medicine was, comparably, de" ned by Rita Charon, a surgeon who 
worked as s surgeon for more than twenty years and decided to enroll in the doctoral study 
English literature, since she concluded that during her years as a surgeon, she was actually 
listening to very complex, very structured narratives by her patients and that she felt that 
‘literature would help her understand medicine be, er’ (2008). 
Of course, narratives are a logical component of every qualitative research of human be-
havior, however, in the " eld of health end illness, “real-life events” like pain, su) ering, " ghting 
cancer, are experiential. / ey are our ‘being-in-the-world’ and medical anthropology’s ambi-
tion is to describe and interpret human su) ering in ‘experience-near’ concepts. / e problem 
which appears here is the problem of de" ning the link between experience and discourse. 
/ e possible answer lies in Csordas’s idea of embodiment (1995). Namely, experience in 
itself does not de" ne a corresponding narrative, neither there is some easy-de" ned, simple, 
naïve, empirical link between experiences and the related narratives. Narratives are cultural 
creations, in order to describe experience, we choose from a set of pre-arranged standard 
narratives. 
But before Csordas, other anthropologists were questioning this link between experience 
and discourse (Geertz 1973; Bruner 1986). Since the famous literary turn in anthropology, 
the idea of discourse and text as guiding principles were di) erently taken over by Ricoeur 
(1981), Foucault (1973), Marcus and Fisher (1999) and textuality was both subject and 
the object of the analysis. But those who tried to " nd the link (Bruner 1986), would always 
conclude that experience surpasses narrative, that “life experience is richer than discourse” 
(Bruner 1986:143). 
In the " eld of health and illness, experience of pain, discomfort, hope, loss, defeat is a 
bodily one, but also a cultural one. Pain is chaos, telling a story of, for example, defeating 
pain, is a way of establishing order and control over pain. Narratives are culturally preor-
dained and can be ‘captured’ and analyzed. “Narrative structures organize and give meaning 
to the experience, but there are always feelings and lived experience not fully encompassed 
by the dominant story” (Bruner 1986:143). Hence, the narratives will get reconstructed, 
expanded, reinvented, broadened, the ‘model of ’ will become ‘the model for’ (Geertz 1973), 
but the experience will still remain elusive.
Besides being structures of meaning, narratives are also “structures of power” (Bruner 
1986:144). In other words, they always carry some models of positioning and ‘political’ 
point of reference. Strikingly enough, most of the narratives I encountered while doing my 
research regarding the patients’ experience in biomedicine, were narratives of powerlessness, 
lack of control, being considered ignorant or ‘not being heard’. To return to the beginning of 
the article: they reported not being paid a, ention to. / eir narratives related to CAM were 
totally the opposite. / ey also reported that the pain was diminishing more a+ er CAM treat-
ments, that improvements were more evident and generally, the experience was more re-
warding. Interestingly enough, except for only two informants, none had any bad-experience 
events in biomedicine. I wanted to analyze the background of this negative narrative and 
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non-negative experience in biomedicine and to " nd the origin of the ‘patients as ignorant 
Others’ narrative, which patients were telling as the dominant narrative related to the role of 
patients in biomedicine. 
Furthermore, medical phenomena through times and places were a junction of social 
interests, political interests and cultural meanings. In our culture, health has climbed to 
the highest values and has gained an inviolable position. / is is sometimes referred to as 
medicalization of society (term from 1970ies), in which an increasing number of phenom-
ena related to human well being are handed over to medicine, which gets jurisdiction over 
them and monopole to solve them. In recent works some theoreticians (Hunsaker-Hawkings 
1999) compare the position of medicine in today’s Western society to the position of reli-
gion in former years. Broadly speaking, religious worldview which was dominant in the past 
was replaced by the dominant scienti" c worldview and hence the parables of life and death 
changed hands from religious to medical authorities. Every human being fears death (or ill-
health), every religion has a system of dealing with death and potential a+ erlife and has its 
own ways of prevention of misfortune. Or, more concretely, medicine is today the dominant 
way of death-prevention and doctors are today the masters of life and death, the image which 
is frequently employed and accentuated. It was this dominant narrative that my informants 
have readily accepted. 
Trouble with Ethnography 
According to Roland Barthes, “of all learned discourse, the ethnological seems to come clos-
est to Fiction” (Barthes 1977). Bruner, on the other hand, calls ethnography a special “genre 
of storytelling” (Bruner 1986:139). While writing ethnographies, we ‘force’ discourse over 
the lived experience, through a series of negotiations with our interlocutors, ourselves, text 
and culture. In choosing Fiction, we are barring the device of our own knowledge-making 
process. Hence, I will outline here brie' y the ‘classical’ ethnography which was the initial 
‘output’ of my " eldwork.
When asked what is the " rst reaction when encountering an illness, the majority of my 
informants would report going to biomedical doctor. / is di) ers signi" cantly from Klein-
man’s " ndings that home, or popular sector, was the primary health sector patients would 
choose. / e reason for this is that, until 1990s, Croatian health care system was state funded. 
/ ere was only one medical insurance “company” – the state. University clinics, day care 
clinics, public health facilities, physicians and specialists from all walks of medicine were ac-
cessible to anyone with a job or to a family member of that person. Hence, since biomedicine 
was so ‘handy’, it was the " rst choice and still remained so 20 years later. 
However, if they felt biomedicine did not help them, people would turn to CAM. CAM, 
on the other hand, was almost totally non-existent in Croatia before the 1990s. / e reasons 
were again political, socialism was the state ideology and socialist state had con" dence in 
‘progressive’ science. Religion or non-materialistic ways of thinking were, as one of my in-
formants emphasized, “considered regressive”. 
According to my informants, there is a long list of diseases and illnesses that biomedicine 
could not cure, but di) erent types of CAM could, such as: allergies, asthma, chronic diseases 
of the pulmonary tract, chronic diseases accompanied by pain lasting for years (arthritis), 
whole post operational care (heart a, acks, kidney or breast-cancer operations), problems 
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with digestive tract, migraines, heartburn, anxieties, feelings of unhappiness, dissatisfaction, 
varicose veins, etc. Also illnesses the biomedicine did not recognize as one of the interlocu-
tors put: “/ e tests say I’m " ne, but I don’t feel " ne”.
Frequent clients of di) erent CAM practitioners were also cancer patients who, as one 
practitioner said himself, were using CAM as the last resort.
One of the central questions of my research was how the patients’ experienced and nar-
rated the di) erences between biomedicine and CAM and how they chose the ‘medical path-
way’ which they followed, i.e. their decision making process. In explaining the di) erence in 
their experience of biomedicine and CAM, my informants would commonly list the ‘usual 
narratives’ about the side e) ects of biomedical drugs we are not aware of, and could kill us, 
about antibiotics and anti-depressives being prescribed too much too o+ en, about cruel, cold 
and distanced treatment of biomedicine, about not being paid a, ention to, etc. Interestingly 
enough, almost none of them had any real examples of being badly treated, but they em-
phasized that what they experienced as the worst element was that they were not having 
any control over how they were being healed or cured, or over the whole medical process 
in general. Hence, the feeling of powerlessness and lack of control were the key elements in 
their experience of biomedicine. 
/ e experience they commonly singled out in CAM as the novel and distinct as com-
pared to biomedicine was spirituality. Most of them said they had no idea that would happen, 
but were commonly satis" ed that it did. However, that spirituality could range from (re)
emergence of Catholicism to the reports such as: “we are not only the body; there is some-
thing out there, now I feel it”. / e importance of Catholic faith form today’s appearance of 
CAM in Croatia will be discussed later, but here I would like to mention that this also had 
certain political background. Namely, during socialism, people went to church but secretly, 
“on the side”. A+ er 1990s, when the right-wing government took power, going to the church 
suddenly meant that you were “the real Croat”: 
I don’t go to church every Sunday like these new believers…nobody went to the church be-
fore…now they are showing their faces in the church… and believing is something else… 
that’s why I don’t go to church now…but I am a strong believer.
/ is “true” spirituality, devoid of politics, they claimed they’ve found in CAM. / eir decision 
making process about di) erent healers or therapies were never meticulous, detailed research 
of what is out there, it was emotional, some would say ‘intuitive’. / ey said they saw a healer 
on TV, saw his/her add in the newspapers the moment they felt pain or felt they need help 
and that was enough. Furthermore, if their experience was positive they would stick to that 
person, emphasize the “close” relationship they’ve established, praise him/her and – expe-
rience improvements. Sometimes, the more unexplainable and ‘miraculous’ improvements 
they reported experiencing, the less questions they were asking about how that was possible.
Conclusion
/ ere are several points to be discussed here. I will relate them to the idea of embodiment 
as Csordas de" nes it: “indeterminate methodological " eld de" ned by perceptual experience 
and by mode of presence and engagement in the world” (Csordas 1999a:145).
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First of all, the idea of medical pluralism as seen in the context of Croatia (and anywhere 
else, I would argue, but in di) erent forms) is the consequence of global, political, " nancial 
conditions. As varied as: rising medical markets, post-socialism, political and religious insti-
tutions working together, spirituality as an issue in postmodernism, notions of body, etc. So, 
I don’t think we could ever list all the changing faces of medical pluralism.
Hence, analyzing this situation, from the point of view of the patients, what they focused 
on was the embodied experience of the healing process they were a part of. / is claim was 
proven by their accounts that they did or did not go to church, did or did not believe in God, 
considered some healers weird or magical, this was all completely irrelevant to them. 
Something in this healing process, from pure participation in it, going in and out of it, 
made their embodied experience in' uence their religious experience, or maybe vice versa, 
but the result was the experienced improvement. From their point of view, ‘everything was 
be, er’, from analytical point of view they were mostly talking about emotions (of joy, hope, 
happiness), mental states (calm, reassurance), and lastly, about physical outcomes. It seemed 
that CAM touched some self-help, self-care bu, on in all of its patients and changed their 
lived experience. 
/ e explanation of ‘miracle’ is here embedded and embodied in bodies and minds of 
each of those individuals who made a choice how to feel, simply, ‘be, er’. 
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U središtu pješčanog sata. 
Etnografi ja odnosa biomedicine i
kompelmentarne i alternativne medicine u Hrvatskoj
Sažetak
Članak se temelji na trogodišnjem istraživanju izbora koji pacijenti čine kada su suočeni s bolešću, 
odluka koje donose u izboru određenog medicinskog sustava i medicinskih praksi, te razloga rastuće 
popularnosti komplementarne i alternativne medicine u suvremenoj Hrvatskoj. Polazeći od priča 
pacijenata i njihovog utjelovljenog iskustva koje je predstavljeno kroz njihov susret s bolešću, članak 
propituje i analizira metodološke, teorijske i epidemiološke stvarnosti su-postojanja biomedicine i 
komplementarne i alternative medicine u Hrvatskoj.
Ključne riječi: komplementarna i alternativan medicina, aktivizam, etnogra$ ja, Hrvatska, medicinska 
antropologija, fenomenologija
